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Abstract. We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related
notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of
subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available in general, we argue
that our model is the appropriate version for timing games. We show that the notion coincides
with the usual one for discrete-time games. Many timing games in continuous time have only
equilibria in mixed strategies – in particular preemption games, which often occur in the
strategic real option literature. We provide a sound foundation for some workhorse equilibria
of that literature, which has been lacking as we show. We obtain a general constructive
existence result for subgame-perfect equilibria in preemption games and illustrate our findings
by several explicit applications.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this work is to provide a framework for subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic
timing games. Therefore we first introduce a reasonable notion of subgames for stochastic
timing games. In continuous time there is no general clear concept of a subgame and it is much
debated whether any such thing can be meaningful at all, compared to extensive form games1.
We argue that indeed there is a quite natural – although probably not obvious – concept for
timing games, since one can characterize decision nodes by stopping times. It is intuitively
quite clear what the relevant information of a “history” in a timing game is: at what time which
player has stopped, yet, and what has been revealed about the uncertain state of the world.
Hence, the information about actions is very elementary and only exogenous information may
∗We would like to thank Jacco Thijssen for many valuable discussions. Financial support by the German
Research Foundation (DFG) via grant Ri 1128-4-1, Singular Control Games: Strategic Issues in Real Options
and Dynamic Oligopoly under Knightian Uncertainty, is gratefully acknowledged.
†Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, Germany; email: friedel@uni-bielefeld.de
‡Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, Germany; email: jsteg@uni-bielefeld.de
1 See, for instance, Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2008), who define an infinite generalization of a classical
tree and show that it is in general necessary that every node has a clearly defined successor to guarantee unique
outcomes of the game.
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cause complexity. Indeed, in continuous time the events that can be associated with some
“past” or history are in general so rich that it is not enough to consider fixed deterministic
dates and their information sets. This is why the notion of stopping time is so important and
we can use it to describe a generic situation in which to execute or revise a stopping decision.
Consistency will be a particularly important issue here, of course.
Given this concept of subgames, we study subgame-perfect equilibria inmixed strategies for
stochastic timing games. In many timing games in continuous time there exist no equilibria in
pure strategies, basically due to the fact that there is no “next” period, onto which one can put
a threat, for instance. This fact tends to be overlooked in part of the more applied literature
and we aim to provide a sound foundation for equilibria that have already become standard
in the strategic real option literature (e.g., the papers listed below). The primary issue is
conceptual: to consider the players’ options properly. This then entails also some technical
issues that one has to address. Another important reason to introduce mixed strategies is
that pure strategy equilibria in symmetric games – if they exist – often involve asymmetric
payoffs that just depend on the respective roles taken by the players. Determining the roles
can be regarded as an additional strategic problem to solve before the timing game starts,
which may be avoided by allowing mixed strategies.
Our basic concept of mixed strategies are distributions over time that may depend on the
state of the world, but only through the available information about uncertainty: they will be
adapted processes. Together with our requirement of time consistency we obtain objects that
correspond to behaviour strategies in discrete-time models as far as the analogy can reach –
since our decision nodes cannot be well ordered in continuous time and it is not possible to
represent distributions over time by specifying conditional probabilities for each point in their
support separately.
It is well known that coordination is very important in many timing games, in particular
when there is a preemption incentive, like in typical strategic real option models. Often some
ad hoc modification of the actual model is used – like tie breaking by coin tosses – to circum-
vent such issues and to obtain any equilibria.2 However, the risk of simultaneous stopping
(resp. investment) is a priori one of the key aspects of such situations. The most notable ap-
proach to enable just sufficient coordination by extending strategy spaces has certainly been
that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), which also aims to capture limits from discrete-time
approximations of the continuous-time game. We generalize their concept to a stochastic
framework, stressing the role of limit outcomes.3 To accomodate standard asymmetric or
stochastic models we have to drop some regularity requirements that Fudenberg and Tirole
use at exactly the most critical point, which has been a somewhat distracting feature. We
propose a more fundamental solution based on limit outcomes, which however still requires a
careful introduction.
In a stochastic setting optimality is much less obvious than in a deterministic one, since
the game and the local incentives do not proceed quite as linearly. Therefore we stress the role
2 See, e.g., Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005).
3 Thijssen et al. (2012) take a different route to adapt the approach of Fudenberg and Tirole to a stochastic
setting. First, they use unconditional strategies, which do not depend on whether the respective other player
has already stopped. Second, they force strategies and outcome distributions to be the same by imposing a joint
restriction on feasible pairs of strategies. The point of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) is exactly that outcome
probabilities and strategies need not be the same if one argues with continuous-time limits from discrete time.
Our strategies are conditional on the stopping history and we allow players to choose any strategy from their
individually feasible set and then determine the resulting outcome distributions.
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of optimal stopping and develop complete formal proofs for the subgame-perfect equilibria we
propose. Specifically, we provide some general characterization of preemptive equilibria and
we illustrate its application by some typical models that allow explicit solutions.
Strategic timing problems appear in an abundance of contexts, and in particular in eco-
nomics. Hence there is a vast literature on this classical topic and we only name a few works
that are most related to ours for certain reasons.
On the one hand there is the literature on mainly deterministic timing problems in con-
tinuous time that is inspired by a wide range of applications, such as preemption models in
economics (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1985); Hendricks and Wilson (1992)) or wars of attri-
tion in biology or economics as well (e.g., Hendricks et al. (1988)). These classes of models are
quite stylized with a systematic first or second-mover advantage. Then, without uncertainty,
the game proceeds indeed very linearly due to perfect foresight. Some complications arise when
the incentives may vary. Laraki et al. (2005) consider general deterministic N -player games
with payoffs that are just continuous functions of time (for given identities of first-movers).
They prove that there do always exist ε-equilibria, but not necessarily exact equilibria.
On the other hand, as we emphasize uncertainty, the literature on Dynkin games with
a large tradition in mathematics also has to be named here. Classically, however, these
are two-person, zero-sum timing games, and the classical question is the existence of an
equilibrium (saddle) point, called value, under varying conditions. We here just refer to the
more recent work by Touzi and Vieille (2002), since their payoff processes are very general
and – more importantly – since they introduce another concept of mixed strategies (but
without consideration of subgames). Touzi and Vieille (2002) prove that many more Dynkin
games have a value if one allows for such mixed strategies.
Quite recently the two strands began to merge by considering stochastic timing games
with non-zero-sum payoffs. Hamadène and Zhang (2010), for instance, prove existence of
Nash equilibrium for 2-player games with a general second-mover advantage.4.
The type of application we are mainly addressing is strategic investment under uncertainty.
An early model that we will have a closer look at is the one of Weeds (2002) and similar ones
of Pawlina and Kort (2006) or Mason and Weeds (2010) and followers. We propose strategies
that do support the equilibrium outcomes described in these papers.
We begin by defining the stochastic timing game and our notion of subgames and mixed
strategies in Section 2. In Section 3 we derive equilibria in extended mixed strategies for
preemption games, i.e., with local first-mover advantages. Our concepts and general results
are illustrated by several applications in Section 4. An appendix collects the proofs and some
technical results.
2 The notion of subgame in continuous-time stopping games
We consider a timing game between two players in continuous time under uncertainty.
Let
(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P
)
be a filtered probability space. Let six adapted, right-continuous
processes Li, F i, and M i for two players i = 1, 2 be given. They correspond to the leader’s,
follower’s, or simultaneous stopping payoff, resp., in the continuous-time stochastic stopping
4 See also Hamadène and Hassani (2014) for an extension to N players using a similar approach.
Laraki and Solan (2013) make less assumptions concerning the incentives in a 2-player game. Consequently,
even allowing for mixed strategies, they can only prove existence of ε-equilibria.
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game that we are going to set up now. The index i is added to allow for asymmetric payoffs.
A pure strategy is a stopping time for a player. Recall that a stopping time τ is a random
time such that the event “stop before time t” is known at time t, or {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft ∀t ≥ 0.
Denote the set of all stopping times or pure strategies by T .
Payoffs depend on the stopping actions of both players. Whenever one of the players stops,
the game ends. If player i ∈ {1, 2} is the sole first to stop at the stopping time τ , he obtains
the (“leader’s”) payoff Liτ . The opponent j ∈ {1, 2} \ i gets the (“follower’s”) payoff F
j
τ .
5 If
both players stop simultaneously, each player i obtains M iτ . Suppose players i and j plan to
stop at the stopping times τi and τj, respectively. Then the game ends at the stopping time
τ = τi ∧ τj and the payoff to player i at time 0 is
pii (τi, τj) := E
[
Liτi1τi<τj + F
i
τj1τj<τi +M
i
τi1τi=τj
]
. (2.1)
Definition 2.1. A timing game Γ is a tuple((
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P
)
,T ×T ,
(
Li, F i,M i
)
i=1,2
,
(
pii
)
i=1,2
)
consisting of a filtered probability space
(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P
)
, stopping times T as pure strate-
gies, adapted processes
(
Li, F i,M i
)
i=1,2
, and payoffs pii as defined in (2.1).
Obviously, equilibria will be based on solving optimal stopping problems involving the
three underlying payoff processes. We need to make some standard regularity assumptions in
order to have well defined problems in the following.
Assumption 2.2.
(i) The filtration F := (Ft)t≥0 satisfies the usual conditions (i.e., F is right-continuous and
complete).
(ii) The processes Li, F i and M i, i ∈ {1, 2}, are adapted, right-continuous (a.s.) and of
class (D), M i having an extension with E[|M i∞|] <∞.
(iii) F i ≥M i (a.s., for any t ∈ R+).
Remark 2.3.
(i) A measurable process X is of class (D) if the family {Xτ : τ <∞ a.s. a stopping time} is
uniformly integrable, so that the family is bounded in L1(P ) and pointwise convergence
of X at a stopping time implies convergence in L1(P ) as well. This is a mild regularity
condition implied, e.g., by either E[supt |Xt|] <∞ or supτ E[|Xτ |
p] <∞ for some p > 1.
We may equivalently define any extension X∞ ∈ L
1(P ) and consider all stopping times
(possibly taking the value ∞) in the previous set; cf. Lemma A.1.
5 F jτ may incorporate the value of the continuation problem of the remaining player j if there still is a
payoff-relevant stopping decision to make. Then, if some player i has already stopped, a new situation arises
for which separate strategies have to be formed that determine the eventual stopping of the follower j. We
concentrate only on histories in which no one has stopped, yet, as it is customary in the literature on stopping
games.
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(ii) It depends on the model whether there is a natural payoff if both players “never stop”,
which may be some limit of M i or of Li. In the latter case we simply set M i∞ := L
i
∞
and work with M i∞ for a unified payoff notation. For convenience we also define
F i∞ :=M
i
∞.
(iii) The assumption F i ≥M i is quite natural if the follower still has a stopping decision to
make, such that F i is the corresponding value function where we include simultaneous
stopping as an option for the “follower”. On a more abstract level the condition means
that we are focussing on competitive models without a strict benefit from coordinating.
2.1 Subgames
Stopping times play a twofold role in our setup. On the one hand, they are players’ pure
strategies as we have seen above, because they are exactly the feasible plans to stop given the
dynamic information F = (Ft)t≥0. On the other hand, we now argue that they encode the
starting point of a subgame in our continuous-time framework.
In discrete time and discrete state spaces, subgames start at a certain node in the game
tree; the node needs to be a singleton information set. Such a node can be naturally described
by a (time) level t in the tree and by an identifiable set of states of the world (which node
k at time t is the case). The random time τ = t if we are in node k at time t and τ = ∞
otherwise is then a stopping time that characterizes that node. In continuous time it is not
enough to identify subgames by considering times t ∈ R+ and events which are measurable
at those times, because stopping times are much richer.6 A typical example for a stopping
time in standard stochastic models is the first time a Brownian motion exceeds a certain fixed
value b > 0. This “first passage time” (or hitting time) has a continuous distribution with full
support on (0,∞).7 When a strategy is to stop at such a hitting time, we also have to know
for subgame perfection what will happen if we are at the hitting time, but stopping does not
occur (i.e., off the path of play). If we only had plans for deterministic times t, we would have
to assemble one for the hitting time out of uncountably many probability zero events, which
would not give a well-defined object in general.
Thus we use the notion of stopping time not only as feasible rules when to stop, but also
as feasible decision nodes to define subgames in stochastic timing games, where players’ plans
may be revised.
Definition 2.4. Let ϑ ∈ T be a stopping time. Let Γ be a timing game. The subgame Γϑ
starting at the stopping time ϑ is the tuple((
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P
)
,Tϑ ×Tϑ,
(
Li, F i,M i
)
i=1,2
,
(
piϑi
)
i=1,2
)
consisting of the filtered probability space
(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P
)
, stopping times greater equal ϑ
Tϑ := {τ ∈ T : τ ≥ ϑ}
6 Similarly the σ-fields Fτ associated with stopping times are a more general concept of a “past” than those
for constant times, Ft.
7 The first passage time has the density b(2pit3)−
1
2 e−b
2/2t > 0 on (0,∞); see, e.g., Revuz and Yor (1999),
Section II.3.
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as pure strategies, adapted processes
(
Li, F i,M i
)
i=1,2
and conditional payoffs
piϑi (τi, τj) = E
[
Liτi1τi<τj + F
i
τj1τj<τi +M
i
τi1τi=τj
∣∣ Fϑ], τi, τj ∈ Tϑ.
Our definition of subgames can also be seen as an analogy to the general approach to
stopping problems for a single decision maker.8 In general the solution of an optimal stopping
problem can be represented as a consistent collection of contingent plans for starting from
any stopping time. Similarly our approach allows us to speak meaningfully of best replies in
subgames and to define subgame-perfect equilibria.
2.1.1 Mixed strategies in subgames
Many timing games have no equilibria in pure strategies.9 We thus introduce mixed strategies,
following the approach by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) but generalizing it to our stochastic
setting. In principle we consider a mixed strategy as a (random) distribution function over
time.10 However, as we are aiming for subgame-perfection, we need players to make plans
also for times at which stopping will already have occurred with probability one according
to the chosen distributions, i.e., which are not expected to be reached. Therefore we first
introduce distributions over remaining time as complete plans of action for every subgame and
then aggregate them as strategies for the whole timing game. Imposing natural consistency
conditions avoids contradictions and ensures well-defined outcomes.
Definition 2.5. Fix a stopping time ϑ ∈ T . An extended mixed strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2}
in the subgame Γϑ starting at ϑ, also called ϑ-strategy, is a pair of processes
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
taking
values in [0, 1], respectively, with the following properties.
(i) Gϑi is adapted. It is right-continuous and non-decreasing with G
ϑ
i (s) = 0 for all s < ϑ,
a.s.
(ii) αϑi is progressively measurable. It is right-continuous where its value is in (0, 1), a.s.
(iii)
αϑi (t) > 0⇒ G
ϑ
i (t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0, a.s.
We further define Gϑi (0−) ≡ 0, G
ϑ
i (∞) ≡ 1 and α
ϑ
i (∞) ≡ 1 for every extended mixed strategy.
Remark 2.6.
(i) As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), the extensions αϑi are used as a coordination instru-
ment where the distribution functions Gϑi jump to 1, and outcomes will be determined
below by a similar limit argument, relying on right-continuity of the former. αϑi = 1
means definite immediate stopping by player i, whence we do not need a right-hand
limit to identify the outcome. In order to accomodate asymmetric models we cannot
generally require right-continuity where αϑi = 0, either; see Section 3.1.
8 See, e.g., El Karoui (1981) for the general theory of optimal stopping and the concept of the Snell envelope.
9 See also Hendricks and Wilson (1992) on (non-)existence of equilibria in deterministic preemption games.
10 An alternative approach is to randomize over stopping times before the game starts. Touzi and Vieille
(2002) show that the two approaches are payoff-equivalent. They do not consider, however, any notion of
subgame (perfection) or further extensions as we do.
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(ii) Progressive measurability ensures enough structure in the time domain such that αϑi (τ)
will be Fτ -measurable for any τ ∈ T .
11 The extensions at t = 0 and t =∞ are defined
only for notational convenience in the definition of payoffs.
Now we aggregate strategies for all single subgames to a strategy for the whole timing
game. It can well be that two stopping times coincide with a certain positive probability. The
strategies are required to give unique and well-defined prescriptions in that case.
Definition 2.7. An extended mixed strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} for the timing game Γ is a
family of ϑ-strategies
(
Gi, αi
)
=
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
ϑ∈T
satisfying the consistency condition Gϑi = G
ϑ′
i
and αϑi = α
ϑ′
i a.s. on the event {ϑ = ϑ
′} for all stopping times ϑ, ϑ′ ∈ T .12 We denote the
set of strategies for each player by S .
2.1.2 Payoffs
We have to generalize the preliminary payoffs (2.1) to subgames and (extended) mixed strate-
gies.
Definition 2.8. Given two extended mixed strategies
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
,
(
Gϑj , α
ϑ
j
)
, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
the payoff of player i in the subgame starting at ϑ ∈ T is
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
:= E
[ ∫
[0,τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑj (s)
)
Lis dG
ϑ
i (s)
+
∫
[0,τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑi (s)
)
F is dG
ϑ
j (s)
+
∑
s∈[0,τˆϑ)
∆Gϑi (s)∆G
ϑ
j (s)M
i
s
+λϑL,iL
i
τˆϑ + λ
ϑ
L,jF
i
τˆϑ + λ
ϑ
MM
i
τˆϑ
∣∣∣∣ Fϑ
]
,
with τˆϑ, λϑL,i, λ
ϑ
L,j and λ
ϑ
M as in Definition 2.9 below.
Lemma A.2 ensures not only that the pathwise integrals (which include possible jumps of
the right-continuous integrators at 0, since i can indeed become leader/follower from an initial
jump of Gϑi /G
ϑ
j , resp.) are well defined under Assumption 2.2, but also that the payoffs are
bounded in L1(P ), uniformly across all feasible strategies.
If the players do not use the extensions (i.e., αϑ1 = α
ϑ
2 ≡ 0 on [ϑ,∞)), then τˆ
ϑ = ∞,
λϑL,1 = λ
ϑ
L,2 = 0 and λ
ϑ
M = ∆G
ϑ
1 (∞)∆G
ϑ
2 (∞), so we have the same payoffs as in the analogous
model with only the mixed strategies Gϑ1 , G
ϑ
2 . Precisely, the “terminal” payoffs then are
(1−Gϑi (∞−))(1−G
ϑ
j (∞−))M
i
∞ because we have defined G
ϑ
i (∞) = α
ϑ
i (∞) = 1.
11 Formally, the mapping αϑi : Ω × [0, t] → R, (ω, s) 7→ α
ϑ
i (ω, s) must be Ft ⊗ B([0, t])-measurable for
any t ∈ R+. It is a stronger condition than (i.e., it implies) adaptedness, but weaker than (i.e., implied by)
optionality, which we have for Gϑi by right-continuity. However, given Definition 2.9 of outcome probabilities,
we can also assume αϑi to be optional without loss by using its unique optional projection
oαϑi instead, which
agrees with αϑi a.s. at any τ ∈ T .
oαϑi is also right-continuous where α
ϑ
i is so at any τ ∈ T , see Lemma A.3.
12 This consistency condition is also implied by the time consistency introduced in Definition 2.11, because
there we require Gϑi = G
ϑ∧ϑ′
i on {ϑ = ϑ ∧ ϑ
′} and Gϑ
′
i = G
ϑ∧ϑ′
i on {ϑ
′ = ϑ ∧ ϑ′}; similarly for α·i.
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τˆϑ denotes the first time any of the extensions αϑ· is positive. If τˆ
ϑ < ∞, then αϑ1 and
αϑ2 determine final outcome probabilities by the limit interpretation of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985), but with our much weaker regularity assumptions needed to accomodate asymmetric
or stochastic games. In particular, Fudenberg and Tirole require their αi(·) to be right-
differentiable to apply a Taylor-expansion at the decisive point, when the αi(·) start to be
positive. One cannot hope for such smoothness in stochastic models. With less restrictions,
we need to take more care that outcomes are always well defined and consistent with the limit
argument whenever possible. Once we have done so, for later applications one can rely on
general results about equilibria in our framework presented in Section 3, as it is also illustrated
in Section 4.
Recall from Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) that the αϑi (·) are interpreted as the limits of
stage stopping probabilities in a repeated stopping game where one lets the period length
vanish. A right-continuous limit αϑi (·) means that the sequences of stage stopping probabilities
are basically constant on small fixed time intervals. The corresponding limit of outcome
probabilities – of who stops first: player 1, 2 or both – is then that of an infinitely repeated
stopping game with the given constant stage probabilities, determined as follows. Define the
functions µL and µM from [0, 1]
2 \ (0, 0) to [0, 1] by
µL(x, y) :=
x(1− y)
x+ y − xy
and µM(x, y) :=
xy
x+ y − xy
.
µL(ai, aj) is the probability that player i stops first in an infinitely repeated stopping game
where i plays constant stage stopping probabilities ai and player j plays constant stage
probabilities aj . µM (ai, aj) is the probability of simultaneous stopping and 1 − µL(ai, aj) −
µM (ai, aj) = µL(aj , ai) that of player j stopping first. Only µM admits a continuous extension
at the origin, µM (0, 0) := 0, but µL does not, which requires careful treatment.
Definition 2.9. Given ϑ ∈ T and a pair of extended mixed strategies
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
and
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
,
the outcome probabilities λϑL,1, λ
ϑ
L,2 and λ
ϑ
M at
τˆϑ := inf{t ≥ ϑ | αϑ1 (t) + α
ϑ
2 (t) > 0}
are defined as follows.13 Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
If τˆϑ < τˆϑj := inf{t ≥ ϑ | α
ϑ
j (t) > 0}, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ)
)
,
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
αϑi (τˆ
ϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ).
If τˆϑ < τˆϑi := inf{t ≥ ϑ | α
ϑ
i (t) > 0}, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1− αj(τˆ
ϑ)
)
∆Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ),
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
αϑj (τˆ
ϑ)∆Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ).
13 There are no conditional expectations in the definition, which one might expect as we are taking limits of
“future” outcome probabilities that are themselves random. However, we have pointwise right-hand limits and
boundedness where αϑi ∈ (0, 1) and thus convergence of expectations when we apply the limit argument. Even
if the lim inf(·) and lim sup(·) in the last case in the definition differ, the latter are progressively measurable
processes by Theorem IV.33 (c) in Dellacherie and Meyer (1978) and hence Fτ -measurable for any τ ∈ T .
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If τˆϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆ
ϑ
2 and α
ϑ
1 (τˆ
ϑ) ∨ αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ) = 1 or αϑ1 (τˆ
ϑ) ∧ αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ) > 0, resp., then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
µL(α
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ), αϑj (τˆ
ϑ)),
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
µM (α
ϑ
1 (τˆ
ϑ), αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ)).
If τˆϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆ
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
1 (τˆ
ϑ) ∨ αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ) < 1 and αϑ1 (τˆ
ϑ) ∧ αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ) = 0, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1− αϑj (τˆ
ϑ)
)
·
(
αϑi (τˆ
ϑ) +
(
1− αϑi (τˆ
ϑ)
) 1
2
{
lim inf
tցτˆϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µL(α
ϑ
i (t), α
ϑ
j (t))
+ lim sup
tցτˆϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µL(α
ϑ
i (t), α
ϑ
j (t))
})
,
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
− λϑL,i − λ
ϑ
L,j
=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1− αϑi (τˆ
ϑ)
)(
1− αϑj (τˆ
ϑ)
)
· µM (α
ϑ
1 (τˆ
ϑ+), αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ+)) if αϑ1 (τˆ
ϑ+) and αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ+) exist.
Remark 2.10.
(i) λϑM is the probability of simultaneous stopping at τˆ
ϑ, while λϑL,i is the probability of
player i becoming the leader, i.e., that of player j becoming follower. It holds that
λϑM+λ
ϑ
L,i+λ
ϑ
L,j =
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
. Dividing by
(
1−Gϑi (τˆ
ϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆ
ϑ−)
)
where feasible yields the corresponding conditional probabilities, which will have to
satisfy time consistency below.
(ii) In the definition we first consider the two cases when one player plays αϑ· positive against
an isolated mass point ∆Gϑ· of the other. In the third case either some α
ϑ
· = 1 and we do
not need a limit, or the latter is well-behaved by right-continuity. In the last case we have
a limit for simultaneous stopping as soon as αϑ1 (τˆ
ϑ+) and αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ+) exist because µM is
continuous also at 0. However, there might be no limit of µL if α
ϑ
1 (τˆ
ϑ) = αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ) = 0
even when both αϑ· are continuous.
14
Here we differ from Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) who ask for right-differentiability and
a positive derivative to apply a Taylor expansion, which is a too strong requirement for
asymmetric or stochastic models; cf. Section 3. Taking instead the symmetric combina-
tion of lim inf and lim sup ensures consistency whenever the limit exists, independence
of the players’ names, and that λϑM coincides with its associated limit whenever the
latter exists. Furthermore, our solution provides no incentives for the players to create
ambiguity about the limit of µL by their choice of strategies (i.e., to exploit the rule of
the last case above): in Section 3 we show that if there exists a best reply to an extended
mixed strategy, then there is a pure one in general.
14 If αϑ1 (τˆ
ϑ) ∨ αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ) < 1 and αϑ1 (τˆ
ϑ+), αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ+) exist, then the limit only may not exist if αϑ1 (τˆ
ϑ+) =
αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ+) = 0, i.e., if αϑ1 (τˆ
ϑ) = αϑ2 (τˆ
ϑ) = 0: if αϑi (τˆ
ϑ+) > 0, the limit of µL is determined by continuity. If the
limit in a potential equilibrium does not exist, both players will be indifferent about the roles; see Lemma A.5.
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2.1.3 Time consistency and subgame-perfect equilibrium
Our definition of strategies already included a consistency condition to avoid contradictions
in view of the high level of redundancy, given the potentially enormous number of stopping
times, i.e., subgames differing only on small events. For a subgame-perfect equilibrium we
further require time consistency in the form of Bayes’ law, resp. that conditional stopping
probabilities agree.
Definition 2.11. An extended mixed strategy
(
Gi, αi
)
is time-consistent if for all ϑ ≤ ϑ′ ∈ T
ϑ′ ≤ t ∈ R+ ⇒ G
ϑ
i (t) = G
ϑ
i (ϑ
′−) +
(
1−Gϑi (ϑ
′−)
)
Gϑ
′
i (t) a.s.
and
ϑ′ ≤ τ ∈ T ⇒ αϑi (τ) = α
ϑ′
i (τ) a.s.
The equilibrium concept is then natural.
Definition 2.12. A subgame-perfect equilibrium for the timing game is a pair
(
G1, α1
)
,(
G2, α2
)
of time-consistent extended mixed strategies such that for all ϑ ∈ T , i, j ∈ {1, 2},
i 6= j, and extended mixed strategies
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a
)
V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) ≥ V
ϑ
i (G
ϑ
a , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) a.s.,
i.e., such that every pair
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
,
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
is an equilibrium in the subgame at ϑ ∈ T ,
respectively.
3 The role of extended mixed strategies in equilibrium
In this section we analyze the payoffs that can result from extended mixed strategies and
show that equilibrium conditions have strong implications for the relevant choices of αϑi . In
particular we establish a quite general characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria in games
of preemption type, which addresses the issues with equilibria proposed in the literature and
which we will use intensely in the applications in Section 4.
Whenever some α·j is positive, player i can secure at least the conditional payoff F
i because
the game definitely ends. More specifically, suppose ϑ = τˆϑj = inf{t ≥ ϑ | α
ϑ
j (t) > 0}. Then
Gϑj (ϑ) = 1 and player i’s payoff from any strategy
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
will be at most that from stopping
at infinity or that from stopping immediately, i.e., V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
≤ max{F iϑ, α
ϑ
j (ϑ)M
i
ϑ+(
1 − αϑj (ϑ)
)
Liϑ}.
15 The maximum can be realized by either the strategy
(
1t≥∞,1t≥∞
)
or
the strategy
(
1t≥ϑ,1t≥ϑ
)
. Consequently, there is a best reply for player i which is pure and
stopping/waiting is strictly optimal iff
Liϑ − F
i
ϑ ≷ α
ϑ
j (ϑ)
(
Liϑ −M
i
ϑ
)
, (3.1)
15 The only case where this may not be so easy to check is when the outcome probabilities λϑL,i and λ
ϑ
M
involve non-trivial limits due to ϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆ
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
1 (ϑ)∧α
ϑ
2 (ϑ) = 0 and α
ϑ
1 (ϑ)∨α
ϑ
2 (ϑ) < 1; the verification for this
case is given by Lemma A.4. The payoff is in fact a convex combination of F iϑ and α
ϑ
j (ϑ)M
i
ϑ+ (1− α
ϑ
j (ϑ))L
i
ϑ,
except for possibly in the case when αϑj (ϑ) = 0 and λ
ϑ
M > 0.
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respectively.16 Since M iϑ ≤ F
i
ϑ, waiting is of course (weakly) optimal whenever L
i
ϑ ≤ F
i
ϑ and
i can only be indifferent in that case if αϑj (ϑ)
(
F iϑ −M
i
ϑ
)
= 0, with αϑj (ϑ) = 1 if L
i
ϑ < F
i
ϑ.
If Liϑ > F
i
ϑ, i is indifferent iff
αϑj (ϑ) =
Liϑ − F
i
ϑ
Liϑ −M
i
ϑ
, (3.2)
which is in (0, 1] a.s.
Based on (3.2) we can thus find equilibria of immediate stopping whenever there is a
first-mover advantage for both players. These equilibria can be interpreted as preemption in
the region {(L1 − F 1) ∧ (L2 − F 2) > 0}. In order to prepare for subgame-perfect equilibria
in asymmetric games where the preemption region is not reached immediately (e.g. Theorem
3.3 below), we make sure that if one player is indifferent about becoming leader or follower
while the other has a strict preference, then the latter can realize the advantage.17
Proposition 3.1. For any τ ∈ T let
τP(τ) := inf{u ≥ τ | (L1u − F
1
u ) ∧ (L
2
u − F
2
u ) > 0}.
Now suppose ϑ ∈ T satisfies ϑ = τP (ϑ) a.s. Then
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
,
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
given by
αϑi (t) =


1 if t = τP(t), Ljt = F
j
t and(
Lit > F
i
t or F
j
t =M
j
t
)
1L1t>F
1
t
1L2t>F
2
t
Ljt − F
j
t
Ljt −M
j
t
else
for any t ∈ [ϑ,∞) and Gϑi = 1t≥ϑ, i = 1, 2, j ∈ {1, 2} \ i, are an equilibrium in the subgame
at ϑ.
The resulting payoffs are V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) = F
i
ϑ1Lj
ϑ
>F j
ϑ
+ Liϑ1Lj
ϑ
=F j
ϑ
.
Proof: See appendix.
Remark 3.2. Note that in particular αϑi (t) = 0 for all t < τ
P(t). On the “boundary” of
the preemption region, i.e., if t = τP(t) but (L1t − F
1
t ) ∧ (L
2
t − F
2
t ) = 0, either α
ϑ
· might
not be right-continuous for three reasons. First, if we have Ljt = F
j
t = M
j
t , there might not
be a right-hand limit αϑi (t+), which we can accomodate by setting α
ϑ
i (t) = 1 as j will be
completely indifferent. Second, in asymmetric models we have to ensure that a player with
a strict first-mover advantage Lit − F
i
t > 0 can realize it by playing α
ϑ
i (t) = 1 and the other
playing αϑj (t) = 0, cf. Theorem 3.3 below. Third, if L
j
t > F
j
t but L
i
t = F
i
t , then 1Lit>F it might
not have a right-hand limit; in this case we have αϑi (t) = 0 (and α
ϑ
j (t) = 1).
16 An extended mixed strategy can only be strictly superior for some player i at a jump ∆Gϑj (τ ) that is not
terminal, in order to secure the payoff ∆Gϑj (τ )F
i
τ + (1 − G
ϑ
j (τ ))L
i
τ if this is the unique optimal limit of pure
(and therefore of any standard mixed) strategies. That limit is not attainable without extensions if F iτ > M
i
τ .
17 The proposition can be modified easily to construct equilibria where no player can realize a first-mover
advantage and both i = 1, 2 receive the payoff F iϑ, respectively. The corresponding extensions are α
ϑ
i (t) =
1t=τP(t)(1Lj
t
=M
j
t
+ 1
L
j
t
>M
j
t
(Ljt − F
j
t )/(L
j
t −M
j
t )).
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In the symmetric case, when the payoff processes do not depend on the players, each
player becomes leader or follower with probability 12 if Lϑ = Fϑ > Mϑ, because then the
lim inf and lim sup in Definition 2.9 are both 12 . This is the same outcome as the result of the
Taylor expansion in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for their smooth, deterministic model. If
Lϑ > Fϑ, there is a positive probability of simultaneous stopping, however, which is the price
of preemption.
αϑi in Proposition 3.1 does not depend on ϑ (except for the feasibility condition α
ϑ
i =0
on [0, ϑ), of course), so applying the construction to any ϑ ∈ T induces a subgame-perfect
equilibrium if for both i = 1, 2, Li > F i almost everywhere. To the contrary, if there is not a
persistent first-mover advantage, then there can exist many different types of equilibria. One
quite general class for which we can use Proposition 3.1 is when the leader’s payoff tends to
increase in expectation, i.e., when Li is a submartingale for each player i = 1, 2. Then no
player wants to stop where F i > Li, so stopping results only from preemption.18
3.1 General issues with preemption equilibria
Such “purely preemptive” equilibria are important in the strategic real options literature;
a simple deterministic example is shown in Figure 1. A number of papers using in fact
stochastic models argue that in equilibrium player 1 becomes leader at τP , where player 2
becomes follower.19
t
L1
L2
F
M
τP T = τF
Figure 1: Preemption with asymmetric leader payoffs
Stopping must occur no later than at τP in equilibrium, because the players would try
to preempt each other where both have a strict first mover-advantage Li > F i. In this
deterministic example it also seems clear that no player wants to stop at any t < τP , because
the payoffs keep increasing. There are two general issues in supporting “stopping at τP” as
an equilibrium.
First, for stopping really to occur at τP , player 1 must not be able to realize a further
increase in L1. Exploiting the increasing payoff can only be prevented by a (credible) threat
of player 2 to stop sufficiently quickly after τP if player 1 does not stop. There is no such
threat in the mentioned papers. There, the follower still has an option to stop (when to enter
a market given that the rival has already entered), F is the corresponding value function,
18 See Theorem 3.3. For the limits of this logic, however, see Section 4.3.
19 See, e.g., Weeds (2002), Pawlina and Kort (2006), Mason and Weeds (2010).
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and the solution is to stop at some later time τF (when the market has sufficiently grown
to sustain duopoly), say here at the terminal time T . That player 2 stops at τF cannot be
an equilibrium strategy. It can only be the outcome of both players trying to stop at or
immediately after τP if no one has stopped before, player 1 succeeding and player 2 reacting
to the changed history by waiting until τF .
We model a proper game theoretic equilibrium of preemption on (τP , T ) with the strategies
given in Proposition 3.1, such that the game ends immediately at any point in this region,
even if some player deviates unilaterally. Both players are also willing to stop immediately
because the extensions αϑi allow to control the probability of simultaneous stopping. The
identity of who stops first (1, 2 or both) determines the entire outcome, the probabilities
of which depend on the relation between Li, F i and M i, i = 1, 2 (through the equilibrium
strategies αϑi ). Any eventual follower’s stopping decision is encoded in F
i.
Second, on [0, τP ) the players must be willing to wait until τP . In the deterministic
example, the players do not want to stop at any t < τP because the payoffs keep increasing.
For waiting until τP to be an equilibrium, however, (i) player 1 must also be sure to become
leader and (ii) player 2 must be sure that there is no possibility of simultaneous stopping. We
support exactly that outcome in Proposition 3.1.20 Otherwise each player would want to stop
ever more closely before τP , which cannot be an equilibrium.
In the typical stochastic models, the state of a Markovian process takes the role of time in
the deterministic example. Then, however, it is not at all obvious whether the players really
want to wait until the preemption region is reached, even if one has a similar ordering of the
payoff “functions” Li and F i on the state space.21 The state does not proceed as linearly as
time, so one needs to study the related stopping problems.
3.2 Subgame-perfect preemption equilibria
A reasonable stochastic analogue of a deterministic increasing leader payoff is assuming Li
to increase in expectation, i.e., to be a submartingale at least outside the preemption region.
Then we get a very general existence result, without any particular assumption on the un-
derlying stochastics. Continuity is however an important property; cf. the example in Section
4.3. An alternative argument to obtain such “purely preemptive” equilibria is presented in
Section 4.2, based on F i being indeed the value process of some follower’s stopping problem.
Theorem 3.3. Assume that each Li is a submartingale and that Li and F i are a.s. continuous,
i = 1, 2. Then there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium
(
G1, α1
)
,
(
G2, α2
)
with αϑi given by
Proposition 3.1 and Gϑi = 1t≥τP (ϑ) for all ϑ ∈ T and i = 1, 2.
The resulting payoffs are
V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) =

E
[
Li
τP (ϑ)
∣∣ Fϑ] if {ϑ < τP(ϑ)} or Ljϑ = F jϑ ,
F iϑ else.
Proof: See appendix.
20 For this outcome we cannot require right-continuity of the αti(·) at τ
P . Note that for any t ≤ τP ,
αt1(τ
P+) = limuցτP 1L1u>F1u 1L2u>F2u
L2u−Fu
L2u−Mu
= 0 and αt2(τ
P+) = limuցτP 1L1u>F1u 1L2u>F2u
L1u−Fu
L1u−Mu
> 0. Defin-
ing both αti(τ
P) by right-continuity would imply player 2 to become leader and player 1 to become follower for
sure.
21 In particular the argument that F i > Li is pointless if the opponent does not intend to stop.
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Remark 3.4. It would suffice that each Li is a semimartingale, hence of the form Li =M i+Ai
with a martingale M i and a finite-variation process Ai (e.g., Li is a diffusion) and that
each Ai, which inherits continuity from Li, is non-decreasing outside the preemption region
{(L1 − F 1) ∧ (L2 − F 2) > 0}.
4 Illustrative examples
In the following we present a few examples to illustrate the equilibrium concept developed in
this paper. Section 4.1 shows the workings of extended mixed strategies in a simple asym-
metric game. Section 4.2 presents the standard model from the theory of investment under
uncertainty and derives mixed strategies to support equilibrium outcomes proposed for similar
models in the literature as subgame-perfect equilibria. Finally, Section 4.3 gives an example
showing that the logic used in Theorem 3.3 is sensitive to jumps.
4.1 Example: the cross-country grab-the-dollar-game
We illustrate our definition of equilibrium with a stochastic version of the grab-the-dollar
game. It serves to illustrate why it is important to allow for adapted (instead of Fτ -
measurable) strategies in the subgames starting at some stopping time τ . With stochastic
payoffs, it is generally impossible to fix one’s own strategy independently of the development
of the state variables.
In our game, we consider an American and her European friend playing the grab-the-
dollar game. When the European wins the dollar, he has to turn it into Euros, at a stochastic
exchange rate given by an adapted, right-continuous process Xt > 0. If both players grab the
dollar at the same time, they pay a penalty of 1 currency unit in their local currency.
Let 0 < exp(−r) < 1 be the discount factor for both players. The payoffs are thus
L1t = exp(−rt) for the American and L
2
t = Xt exp(−rt) for the European if they win the dollar,
respectively. As in the usual grab-the-dollar game, F i = 0, and we setM1t =M
2
t = − exp(−rt)
for the simultaneous entry payoffs.
Proposition 4.1. A subgame-perfect equilibrium is given by the strategies Gϑi (t) = 1{t≥ϑ}, i =
1, 2 (“grab immediately”) and
αϑ1 (t) =
Xt
1 +Xt
1{t≥ϑ}
and
αϑ2 (t) =
1
2
1{t≥ϑ}
for all stopping times ϑ ∈ T and t ≥ 0.
This equilibrium is an application of Proposition 3.1. Feasibility and time-consistency of
the strategies are straightforward to verify.
4.2 Example: preemptive market entry
Now we present a typical example of a strategic real option exercise problem and show how
to derive subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies for similar models.
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Two firms i = 1, 2 have the opportunity to invest irreversibly in the same market. The
return from investment, in particular the profit flow from operating in the market, is uncertain.
Assume the duopoly profit flow when both firms have invested is given by the stochastic
process X = (Xt)t≥0. If only one firm is present in the market it can realize a monopoly
markup and increase the profit flow to MXt for some constant M > 1. To obtain possibly
explicit results and because this is the most familiar model in the literature we let X be a
geometric Brownian motion; the idea of proof will apply to more general processes, though.
Hence, we assume X is the unique strong solution to the stochastic differential equation
dX
X
= µdt+ σ dB
with given initial value X0 = x ∈ R+, where B is a Brownian motion and µ, σ some constants.
There is a sunk cost of investment I > 0. We assume that profits are discounted at a common
and constant rate r > max(µ, 0), which ensures integrability of our payoff processes and
finiteness of the subsequent stopping problems.22
If firm i invests at time t as the leader, the other firm that becomes follower still has the
option to invest at some later time. The follower’s payoff process F is thus the value function
of the optimal stopping problem
Ft := sup
τ≥t
E
[∫ ∞
τ
e−rs(Xs − rI) ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
=


e−rt
(
Xt
xF
)β1 ( xF
r − µ
− I
)
if Xt < x
F
e−rt
(
Xt
r − µ
− I
)
else.
The explicit solution is a standard result where the investment threshold for the state process
X is given by
xF =
β1
β1 − 1
(r − µ)I > rI,
and β1 > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation 0 =
1
2σ
2β(β − 1) + µβ − r.
If the leader invests at any stopping time ϑ, we denote the optimal investment time of the
follower by
τF (ϑ) =: inf{s ≥ ϑ |Xs ≥ x
F },
whence the leader enjoys the monopoly profit only on [ϑ, τF (ϑ)). Thus the leader’s payoff
process L is given by
Lt := E
[∫ τF (t)
t
e−rs(MXs − rI) ds +
∫ ∞
τF (t)
e−rs(Xs − rI) ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
22With r > max(µ, 0), (e−rtXt) is bounded by an integrable random variable. Indeed, for σ > 0 we have
supt e
−rtXt = X0e
σZ with Z = suptBt − t(r − µ + σ
2/2)/σ, which is exponentially distributed with rate
2(r− µ)/σ + σ (see, e.g., Revuz and Yor (1999), Exercise (3.12) 4◦). Thus, E[supt e
−rtXt] = X0(1 + σ
2/2(r−
µ)) ∈ R+, implying that (e
−rtXt) is of class (D); analogously for σ < 0.
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=


e−rt
(
MXt
r − µ
− I +
(
Xt
xF
)β1 (xF (1−M)
r − µ
))
if Xt < x
F
Ft else.
Finally, the payoff from simultaneous investment is simply given by
Mt := E
[∫ ∞
t
e−rs(Xs − rI) ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
= e−rt
(
Xt
r − µ
− I
)
,
i.e., Mt = Ft = Lt whenever Xt ≥ x
F .
In order to determine when there is a first- or second-mover advantage, we can rely on
the strong Markov property and identify the corresponding regions of the state space of the
process X: there exists a unique xP ∈ (0, xF ) such that23

Lt < Ft iff Xt ∈ [0, x
P ),
Lt > Ft iff Xt ∈ (x
P , xF ).
Consequently, the interval P = (xP , xF ) is the preemption region for the driving process X.
On {X ∈ P} we have equilibria of immediate stopping with coordination by extended mixed
strategies following Proposition 3.1, resulting in the immediate payoffs F . Let
τP(ϑ) := inf{s ≥ ϑ |Xs ∈ P}
denote the hitting time of the preemption region after any stopping time ϑ ∈ T .
On {Xϑ < x
P } we have Lϑ < Fϑ = E[FτP (ϑ)|Fϑ] = E[LτP (ϑ)|Fϑ], since F is a martingale
in its continuation region up to τF (ϑ) > τP(ϑ). From this observation one can prove that
stopping is dominated on [ϑ, τP (ϑ)) where Xϑ < x
P . In particular this is obvious if the
opponent does not stop on that interval, because then each player’s stopping problem has at
least the value E[FτP (ϑ)|Fϑ] = E[LτP (ϑ)|Fϑ].
24
23 Consider time 0, recalling that X0 = x ∈ R+. We express the dependence on the starting value by writing
L0 = L(x) and F0 = F (x). Then L(x)− F (x)→ −I < 0 for x→ 0. Further,
∂(L(x)− F (x))
∂x
=
M
r − µ
+
β1
xF
(
x
xF
)β1−1 (
I −
MxF
r − µ
)
.
The term in the last parentheses is strictly negative by M > 1. Thus the displayed derivative is strictly
decreasing in x, starting at M/(r − µ) > 0 for x = 0 and ending at (1 −M)(β1 − 1)/(r − µ) < 0 for x = x
F ,
where L(xF ) = F (xF ). Hence there exists a unique xP ∈ (0, xF ) such that L(x)− F (x) < 0 iff x ∈ [0, xP ) and
L(x)− F (x) > 0 iff x ∈ (xP , xF ).
24 This value obtains for player i from stopping at τP(ϑ) if ∆Gϑj (τ
P(ϑ))(FτP(ϑ)−MτP (ϑ)) = 0, from stopping
after τP(ϑ) if ∆Gϑj (τ
P(ϑ)) = 1, or otherwise from the limit of stopping at τP(ϑ) + ε where εց 0. In the last
case the probability of simultaneous stopping converges to 0 since any Gϑj of the opponent needs to be right-
continuous, and (right-)continuity of L induces the claimed limit value (which will however not be attained by
stopping at τP(ϑ), due to ∆Gϑj (τ
P(ϑ))(FτP(ϑ) −MτP (ϑ)) > 0).
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Finally, letM = [xF ,∞), so thatMt = Ft iff Xt ∈M. On {X ∈M} we have equilibria of
simultaneous stopping. In fact, given that the preemption payoffs on {X ∈ P} are F , stopping
is even strictly dominant on {X ∈ M}, because then the drift of the supermartingale F is
the strictly negative forgone revenue −e−rt(Xt− rI) dt. We can summarize as follows, letting
τM(ϑ) := inf{s ≥ ϑ |Xs ∈M} denote the hitting time of M.
Proposition 4.2. There exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium for the present preemption ex-
ample with extended mixed strategies
(
G1, α1
)
and
(
G2, α2
)
given as follows. For any i = 1, 2
and ϑ ∈ T set
αϑi (t) =


Lt − Ft
Lt −Mt
if Lt > Ft ⇔ Xt ∈ P = (x
P , xF )
1 if Ft =Mt ⇔ Xt ∈M = [x
F ,∞)
0 else
and
Gϑi (t) = 1t≥τP (ϑ)∧τM(ϑ)
for any t ∈ [ϑ,∞].
The resulting payoffs are V ϑi (G
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j ) = E
[
FτP (ϑ)∧τM(ϑ)
∣∣ Fϑ].
Proof: See appendix.
Fully explicitly, we have
αϑi (t) =
MXt
r − µ
− I +
(
Xt
xF
)β1 (
I −
MxF
r − µ
)
(M − 1)Xt
r − µ
+
(
Xt
xF
)β1 ((1−M)xF
r − µ
) , Xt ∈ P.
The extensions αϑi (·) here inherit continuity from the payoff processes.
25 As remarked more
generally in the context of Proposition 3.1, each firm eventually becomes leader or follower
with probability 12 in any subgame that starts with Xϑ ≤ x
P .
4.3 Sensitivity to jumps
The following simple economic example illustrates the sensitivity of the logic brought forward
in Sections 3.1, 3.2 – that stopping is dominated where Li < F i and Li is (strictly) increasing
in expectation – to continuity of the payoff processes. We will show that in any equilibrium
of the example, stopping occurs strictly before reaching the preemption region (where both
25 This is clear except for possibly two cases. If Xt = x
P , then Lt = Ft and limu→t 1Lu>Fu(Lu−Fu)/(Lu−
Mu) = 0 as Lt > Mt for Xt 6∈ M. If Xt = x
F = ∂M, then
lim
u→t
αϑi (u) = lim
u→t
[
1Lu>Fu(Lu − Fu)/(Lu −Mu) + 1Fu=Mu
]
= 1 = αϑi (t),
because limxրxF (L(x)−F (x))/(L(x)−M(x)) = 1 by l’Hôpital (with the notation of footnote 23, writing also
M(x) =M0 for X0 = x).
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players have a first-mover advantage), although the following regularity properties hold: For
each i = 1, 2 the leader payoff process Li is a strict submartingale that is further upper-
semicontinuous (the usual regularity condition for optimal stopping), and the follower process
F i is continuous; the preemption region is non-empty with probability 1. We will actually
construct subgame-perfect equilibria with immediate stopping at any time.
Consider two rival firms that can each make an investment to diversify to a new product. If
only one firm invests, it will take up the new market, while the other then becomes monopolist
for the old product. The latter is worth a net present value c at the time of investment.
Initially only firm 1 has developed a profitable technology for switching to the new product,
such that it can invest into it any time. The technology keeps improving, however, so the
value of capturing the new market is increasing in time, even if discounted to time 0. Firm
2 initially has an inferior technology, such that investing into the new product would only
yield it a net present value 1 at the time of investment. However, firm 2 can catch up to the
superior technology at the hazard rate λ > 0, after which it could realize the same profit as
firm 1. As usual, simultaneous investment is the worst outcome.
We model the payoff processes as follows:
L1 =
(
a− e−rtb
)
t∈[0,∞)
, a = 2 + rλ , b =
r
r+λ ,
L2 =
(
e−rt1t<T + (a− e
−rtb
)
1t≥T )t∈[0,∞),
F 1 = F 2 =
(
e−rtc
)
t∈[0,∞]
, c ∈ [1, 1 + b),
≥M1, M2.
The choice of theM i, the payoffs for simultaneous investment, is unimportant as long as there
is a (weak) penalty.26 r > 0 is the fixed discount rate. T is the random time at which firm 2
catches up, it is exponentially distributed with parameter λ and defined on some stochastic
basis (Ω,F , P ). Assume this is the only uncertainty, i.e., the filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,∞) is
generated by the process (1t≥T ).
Notice for the sake of the argument that F 2t > L
2
t on [0, T ) for c > 1. All processes except
for L2 (and M1, M2, if we like) are continuous. L2 is continuous from the right and upper-
semicontinuous from the left, because a > 2 > (1 + b) ≥ e−rt(1 + b). L1 is strictly increasing
and also L2 is a strict submartingale.27 The key property for the intended result is that L2 is
strictly decreasing up to T and exceeds the expected value of becoming follower at T as we
will show, so firm 2 will stop immediately if there is too little chance to realize L2 after T .
26 Also F 1 can be modified, for the argument we only need F 1 ≤ F 2.
27 Fix two times 0 ≤ s < t. On {s ≥ T} we have E[L2t |Fs]− L
2
s = e
−rsb− e−rtb > 0. On {s < T},
E[L2t |Fs] = e
−rtP [T > t | T > s] + (a− e−rtb)P [T ≤ t | T > s]
= e−rte−λ(t−s) + (a− e−rtb)(1− e−λ(t−s))
and thus
∂E[L2t |Fs]/∂t = −(r + λ)e
−rte−λ(t−s)(1 + b) + aλe−λ(t−s) + re−rtb > 0 ∀t > s ≥ 0
⇔ aλert + reλ(t−s)b > (r + λ)(1 + b) ∀t > s ≥ 0
⇔ aλ+ rb ≥ (r + λ)(1 + b)
⇔ a ≥ (1 + b) + r
λ
.
Hence, E[L2t |Fs] > limuցsE[L
2
u |Fs] = e
−rs = L2s.
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The preemption region is {(L1 − F 1)∧ (L2 − F 2) > 0} = {T ≤ t <∞} ⊂ Ω× [0,∞] since
a > b+ c ≥ e−rtb+ e−rtc. Its hitting time, starting from time 0, is
τP := inf{s ≥ 0 | (L1s − F
1
s ) ∧ (L
2
s − F
2
s ) > 0} = T.
Now suppose there is an equilibrium with preemption using extended mixed strategies inside
the preemption region, i.e., with continuation payoff F iϑ for each firm i = 1, 2 and any stopping
time ϑ > τP = T . Assume that at T , however, the firms can agree on events A1 and A2 with
P [A1 ∩ A2] = 0, such that firm i even obtains L
i
T on Ai by playing αi(T ) = 1 and playing
αi(T ) = 0 on Aj , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Let Ai in fact be exactly the event where αi(T ) = 1, so
i’s payoff on Aci is F
i
T . If there is no stopping on [0, T ), then the expected payoffs are
E[L1T1A1 + F
1
T1Ac1 ] = E[(a− e
−rT b)1A1 + e
−rT c1Ac1 ]
and
E[L2T1A2 + F
2
T1Ac2 ] ≤ E[(a− e
−rT b)1Ac1 + e
−rT c1A1 ].
The estimate follows from L2T > F
2
T and P [A2\A
c
1] = P [A1\A
c
2] = 0. The sum of the expected
payoffs is not more than a− bE[e−rT ]+ cE[e−rT ] = a− (b− c)λ/(r+λ) < a− b+1 = L10 +L
2
0,
contradicting the hypothesized equilibrium.
Now suppose there is an equilibrium with mixed strategies GTi in the preemption region.
From T onwards, the payoff processes are deterministic and continuous. Hendricks and Wilson
(1992) show that mixed equilibrium strategies must satisfy
dGTi
1−GTi
=
dLj
Lj − F j
=
re−rtb dt
a− e−rt(b+ c)
, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
where continuous mixing occurs. We here have 0 < (a − e−rt(b + c))−1 ≤ (a − b − c)−1 <
λ(r + λ)/(r2 + λ2) < ∞ and thus
∫∞
T (1 − G
T
i )
−1 dGTi < ∞, i = 1, 2, so there would remain
some mass for stopping at t = ∞ for both firms. However, M i∞ ≤ F
i
∞ = 0 < limtր∞ L
i
t = a
for both i = 1, 2, so there cannot be joint stopping at t =∞.
It follows from Theorems 2 and 3 in Hendricks and Wilson (1992) that at T there only
exist equilibria with at least one firm i stopping immediately, i.e., GT1 (T ) ∨ G
T
2 (T ) = 1. A
firm that stops receives not more than LiT and the respective other receives F
j
T (there may be
simultaneous stopping if F iT = M
i
T , i = 1, 2). Now the previous argument based on the sets
Ai = {G
T
i (T ) = 1} applies again, so stopping must occur strictly before T in equilibrium.
The estimate above extends to any time t ∈ [0, T ), taking conditional expectations. In fact,
there exist the following subgame-perfect equilibria with either firm stopping immediately on
[0, T ). Set
αϑ1 (t) = 1t≥T
L2t − F
2
t
L2t −M
2
t
and αϑ2 (t) = 1t≥T
L1t − F
1
t
L1t −M
1
t
for all stopping times ϑ and t ∈ [0,∞). Now pick i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j and set Gϑi = 1t≥ϑ (stop
immediately) and Gϑj = 1t≥ϑ∨T (stop at preemption region) for all ϑ. On {ϑ ≥ T} there is
preemption with payoffs F 1ϑ , F
2
ϑ . On {ϑ < T}, j cannot deviate profitably because M
j ≤ F j .
Firm i could wait until any τ ≥ ϑ to obtain Liτ1τ<T + F
i
T1τ≥T . The process (L
i
t1t<T +
F iT1t≥T )t≥0 is however a strict supermartingale for both i = 1, 2 with our parametrization.
28
Thus, stopping immediately is indeed optimal.
28 Fix two times 0 ≤ s < t. On {s < T} we have E[L1t1t<T +F
1
T1t≥T |Fs] = (a−e
−rtb)e−λ(t−s) (for F 1 ≡ 0)
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5 Conclusion
We have presented a framework for subgame-perfect equilibria of stochastic timing games,
where the notion of a subgame is linked to that of a stopping time. The latter are the
feasible (random) time quantities to plan an action, and hence also to revise any plan. In
continuous time the events that are decidable by stopping times are generally more complex
than combinations of events from a collection of deterministic times (in contrast to discrete
time).
In many timing games mixed strategies play an important role as we have argued, ei-
ther for equilibrium existence or to resolve any strategic conflicts (about roles with differ-
ing amenities) within the game. Concerning both aspects we have taken up the concept of
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to extend mixed strategies of a more classical sense towards im-
proved consistency with limits from discrete time – instead of modifying the underlying game
payoffs to circumvent coordination problems (as frequently done by coin tossing, e.g.). The
extensions allow to solve coordination problems about roles in equilibrium endogenously and
there is generally a price to pay for preemption, in terms of coordination failure.
The generalization to stochastic models has not been straightforward, however. With
necessarily weaker regularity restrictions on strategies, one has to be very careful how to define
unique outcomes that are possibly consistent with the motivating limits. With this framework
fixed, we obtained a general characterization of equilibria in subgames of preemption type.
The main issue is then to verify equilibria in subgames where there is not a first-mover
advantage for both players, by solving appropriate stopping problems. We have covered some
important cases for applications and thus provided a foundation for the literature on strategic
real options, which is often lacking rigorous arguments.
Of course the models where stopping occurs only due to preemption are just a special –
if important – class. We presented an example which seems to follow the logic of that class,
but where stopping occurs much earlier to avoid preemption later on. There may also be
other forms of stopping, with the players using continuous distribution functions. The paper
Steg and Thijssen (2014) presents such a case, where the regime of a game in which two
players have a switching option moves randomly between first- and second-mover advantages.
Then both components of the extended mixed strategies introduced here play important roles.
and
E[L2t1t<T + F
2
T1t≥T |Fs] = e
−rte−λ(t−s) + e−rsc λ
r+λ
(1− e−(r+λ)(t−s))
(resp. E[L1t1t<T + F
1
T1t≥T | Fs] ≤ (a − e
−rtb)e−λ(t−s) + e−rsc λ
r+λ
(1 − e−(r+λ)(t−s)) for any other choice of
F 1 ≤ F 2). Now one can continue as in footnote 27.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. By construction, Gϑi and α
ϑ
i are a.s. [0, 1]-valued. G
ϑ
i is right-
continuous, non-decreasing, attaining 1 where αϑi (t) > 0, t ≥ ϑ. α
ϑ
i takes values in (0, 1) only
where (L1t − F
1
t ) ∧ (L
2
t − F
2
t ) > 0, where it is indeed right-continuous.
Gϑi is adapted. α
ϑ
i is progressively measurable because we can represent it using the
process (1t=τP (t)), which is the upper-right-continuous modification of the optional pro-
cess (1(L1t−F 1t )∧(L2t−F 2t )>0) and therefore progressively measurable by Theorem IV.33 (c) in
Dellacherie and Meyer (1978) – our F satisfies the usual conditions.
By ϑ = τP(ϑ) we also have ϑ = τˆϑi = inf{u ≥ ϑ | α
ϑ
i (u) > 0} and L
i
ϑ ≥ F
i
ϑ a.s.,
i = 1, 2. By our observations about (3.2) we have indifference where (L1ϑ−F
1
ϑ )∧ (L
2
ϑ−F
2
ϑ ) >
0, implying payoff F 1ϑ , resp. F
2
ϑ , and it only remains to verify that each player i obtains
max{F iϑ, α
ϑ
j (ϑ)M
i
ϑ + (1 − α
ϑ
j (ϑ))L
i
ϑ} in the cases L
1
ϑ = F
1
ϑ or L
2
ϑ = F
2
ϑ . Now fix i, j ∈ {1, 2},
i 6= j. Consider first Liϑ = F
i
ϑ. If L
j
ϑ > F
j
ϑ then α
ϑ
j (ϑ) = 1 and α
ϑ
i (ϑ) = 0 is optimal. If
also Ljϑ = F
j
ϑ then still α
ϑ
j (ϑ) = 1 where F
i
ϑ =M
i
ϑ, where i is completely indifferent. Finally,
where Ljϑ = F
j
ϑ and F
i
ϑ > M
i
ϑ, α
ϑ
j (ϑ) = α
ϑ
j (ϑ+) = 0. Then α
ϑ
i (ϑ) = 1 where F
j
ϑ = M
j
ϑ is
optimal, as is αϑi (ϑ) = α
ϑ
i (ϑ+) = 0 where F
j
ϑ > M
j
ϑ, since then λ
ϑ
M = 0. In all these cases the
payoff is F iϑ = L
i
ϑ.
Finally consider Liϑ > F
i
ϑ and L
j
ϑ = F
j
ϑ, whence α
ϑ
j (ϑ) = 0 and thus α
ϑ
i (ϑ) = 1 is optimal.
In this case the payoff is Liϑ.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Admissibility of the strategies for any ϑ ∈ T is obtained as in
the proof of Proposition 3.1 and time-consistency is obvious. For any ϑ ∈ T and i = 1, 2,(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
is also admissible for the subgame starting at τP(ϑ) and Proposition 3.1 shows that(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
and
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
are mutual best replies at τP(ϑ). For {ϑ = τP(ϑ)} this directly implies
optimality. For {ϑ < τP(ϑ)} and any admissible
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a
)
, time consistency and iterated
expectations yield the estimate
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
≤ V ϑi
(
Gϑa1t<τP (ϑ) + 1t≥τP (ϑ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1t≥τP (ϑ)
[
Gϑa(τ
P(ϑ)−) + (1−Gϑa(τ
P (ϑ)−))Gϑi
], α
ϑ
a1t<τP (ϑ) + α
ϑ
i 1t≥τP (ϑ), G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
,
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Furthermore, since 1t<τP (ϑ)∆G
ϑ
j (t) ≡ 0,
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a1t≥τP (ϑ), G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
.
Together, and using that in fact Gϑj (τ
P (ϑ)−) = 0, we have
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
≤ V ϑi
(
Gϑa1t<τP (ϑ) + 1t≥τP (ϑ), α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[∫
[0,τP (ϑ))
Lis dG
ϑ
a(s) + (1−G
ϑ
a(τ
P(ϑ)−))V
τP (ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
) ∣∣∣∣ Fϑ
]
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=
∫ 1
0
E
[
LiτGa (x)
1τGa (x)∈[0,τP (ϑ))
∣∣∣∣ Fϑ
]
dx
+
∫ 1
0
E
[
V
τP (ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
1τGa (x)∈[τP (ϑ),∞]
∣∣∣∣ Fϑ
]
dx
≤ ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[
Liτ1τ<τP (ϑ) + V
τP (ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
i
1τ≥τP (ϑ)
∣∣∣ Fϑ],
where we apply a change of variable as in Lemma A.2 and Fubini’s Theorem in the second
last step. At τP(ϑ), the optimal payoff is fixed at
V
τP (ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= F iτP (ϑ)1Lj
τP (ϑ)
>F j
τP (ϑ)
+ LiτP (ϑ)1Lj
τP (ϑ)
=F j
τP (ϑ)
.
If Li and F i are continuous, i = 1, 2, then (L1τP (ϑ) − F
1
τP (ϑ)) ∧ (L
2
τP (ϑ) − F
2
τP (ϑ)) = 0 on
{ϑ < τP (ϑ)}, a.s. Hence for the given strategies,
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[
V
τP (ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
) ∣∣∣ Fϑ]
= E
[
LiτP (ϑ)1Lj
τP (ϑ)
>F j
τP (ϑ)
+ LiτP (ϑ)1Lj
τP (ϑ)
=F j
τP (ϑ)
∣∣∣ Fϑ]
= E
[
LiτP (ϑ)
∣∣∣ Fϑ] = ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[
Liτ∧τP (ϑ)
∣∣∣ Fϑ]
= ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[
Liτ1τ<τP (ϑ) + V
τP (ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
1τ≥τP (ϑ)
∣∣∣ Fϑ].
Therefore player i has no incentive to change the strategy
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
by placing any mass on
[ϑ, τP (ϑ)).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 3.3, except that
we use the martingale property of F in its continuation region {X ∈ [0, xF )} instead of
a submartingale property of L.29 Concerning the payoffs, fix ϑ ∈ T . If Xϑ ≥ x
P , then
the payoffs to both players are V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= Fϑ and optimality follows again from
Proposition 3.1. If Xϑ < x
P , i.e., ϑ < τP(ϑ), then we replace the estimate in the proof of
Theorem 3.3 by
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
≤ V ϑi
(
Gϑa1t<τP (ϑ) + 1t≥τP (ϑ), α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[∫
[0,τP (ϑ))
Ls dG
ϑ
i (s) + (1−G
ϑ
a(τ
P(ϑ)−))V
τP (ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
) ∣∣∣∣ Fϑ
]
=
∫ 1
0
E
[
LτGa (x)1τGa (x)∈[0,τP (ϑ))
∣∣∣∣ Fϑ
]
dx
+
∫ 1
0
E
[
V
τP (ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
1τGa (x)∈[τP (ϑ),∞]
∣∣∣∣ Fϑ
]
dx
29 L need not be a submartingale outside the preemption region, depending on the parameter values. In
particular one can show that if µ ≤ 0, the drift of L is strictly negative for all M sufficiently close to 1 and Xt
sufficiently close to xP .
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≤
∫ 1
0
E
[
FτGa (x)1τGa (x)∈[0,τP (ϑ))
∣∣∣∣ Fϑ
]
dx
+
∫ 1
0
E
[
FτP (ϑ)
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
1τGa (x)∈[τP (ϑ),∞]
∣∣∣∣ Fϑ
]
dx
= E
[
FτP (ϑ)
∣∣ Fϑ] = V ϑi (Gϑi , αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj ).
A.2 Technical results
Lemma A.1. A measurable process X = (Xt)t∈R+ is of class (D) iff the set {Xτ : τ a stopping
time} is uniformly integrable for any given X∞ ∈ L
1(P ).
Proof. We only need to show necessity: Let X be of class (D) and fix arbitrary X∞ ∈
L1(P ) and let T denote the set of all stopping times. Then, for any τ ∈ T and n ∈ N,
|Xτ∧n|1τ<∞ ≤ |Xτ∧n|. Hence the set {|Xτ∧n|1τ<∞ : τ ∈ T , n ∈ N} ∪ {|Xτ | : τ <∞ ∈ T } is
uniformly integrable as well. As we may also include limits in probability of its elements, and
|Xτ |1τ<∞ = limn→∞ |Xτ∧n|1τ<∞ a.s. for any τ ∈ T , we observe that {|Xτ | 1τ<∞ : τ ∈ T }
is uniformly integrable.
With X∞ ∈ L
1(P ), also {|X∞|1τ=∞ : τ ∈ T } is uniformly integrable. Now let
ε
2 > 0. By
uniform integrability there exists a δ > 0 such that max
{
E[|Xτ | 1τ<∞1A], E[|X∞|1τ=∞1A]
}
≤
ε
2 for any measurable A with P (A) < δ and any τ ∈ T . Hence we have E[(|Xτ | 1τ<∞ +
|X∞| 1τ=∞)1A] ≤ ε, which shows that {|Xτ |1τ<∞ + |X∞| 1τ=∞ : τ ∈ T } is uniformly inte-
grable as claimed.
Lemma A.2. If L is a (measurable) process of class (D) then there exists a constant K ∈ R+
such that for any process G that is a.s. right-continuous, non-decreasing, non-negative and
bounded by some G∞ ∈ L
∞(P ) and all random variables 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ ∞ a.s. we have
(i)
E
[∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt
]
≤ K‖G∞‖∞ <∞
and
(ii) ∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt =
∫ ∞
0
∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1τG(x)∈[a,b) dx <∞ a.s.,
where τG(x) := inf{t ≥ 0 |Gt ≥ x}, x ∈ R+, and ∆G0 ≡ G0; equivalently, “Gt > x” in τ
G(x).
If {|Lτ | 1τ<∞ : τ ∈ T } is bounded in L
∞(P ) by K ∈ R+ and G bounded by some G∞ ∈
L1(P ), (i) holds with KE[G∞] instead and (ii) as stated.
Proof. The (a.s.) non-decreasing family of stopping times
(
τG(x)
)
x∈R+
is the left-continuous
inverse of G, which satisfies
τG(x) ≤ t ⇔ Gt ≥ x.
Thus, with the convention
∫
[0,c] dG = Gc,
∫
[0,∞) 1A dG =
∫∞
0 1τG(x)∈A dx for all A ∈ {[0, c] :
c ∈ R+} and hence for A = R+ by monotone convergence, a.s. By a monotone class argu-
ment30 the relation holds on all of B(R+) a.s.
Since L·(ω) : R+ → R, t 7→ Lt(ω), is Borel measurable
31 like the function 1t∈[a(ω),b(ω)) , we
30 See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Theorem 1.1.
31 See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Lemma 1.26 (i).
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now obtain the following change-of-variable formula32:∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt =
∫
{τG(x)<∞}
∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1τG(x)∈[a,b) dx a.s.
As inf{t ≥ 0 |Gt > x} = τ
G(x+), which differs from τG(x) only on a set of Lebesgue measure
(dx) 0, we can equivalently use the former. By Fubini’s Theorem
E
[∫ ∞
0
∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1τG(x)∈[a,b) dx
]
≤
∫ ‖G∞‖∞
0
E
[∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1τG(x)<∞] dx. (A.1)
As L is of class (D), {|Lτ |1τ<∞ : τ ∈ T } is bounded in L
1(P ) by some K <∞, whence the
RHS of (A.1) is bounded by K‖G∞‖∞ if the latter is finite. If supτ∈T ‖Lτ1τ<∞‖∞ ≤ K and
G bounded by G∞ ∈ L
1(P ), then the RHS of (A.1) is bounded by
∫ ∞
0
E
[
K1τG(x)<∞
]
dx = E
[∫ ∞
0
K1τG(x)<∞ dx
]
≤ KE[G∞] <∞.
In either case it follows that
∫
[a,b) |Lt| dGt <∞ a.s.
Lemma A.3. Suppose α is a progressively measurable process and oα its optional projection.
Let τ ∈ T be given. Then oα is a.s. right-continuous at τ <∞ where α is so.
Proof. For any ε > 0 define τε := inf{t ≥ τ : |αt − ατ | > ε} ∈ T as α is progressive. Then
the set Bε := {(ω, t) | τ ≤ t <∞,
oαt−
oατ > ε}∩ [τ, τε) is optional and P [σ ∈ Bε] = 0 for any
σ ∈ T because ασ =
oασ on {σ <∞} a.s. Hence, if we denote by Aε the canonical projection
of Bε onto Ω, P [Aε] = 0 by the optional section theorem (Dellacherie and Meyer (1978),
Theorem IV.84), and therefore Ac :=
⋂
n∈NA
c
1/n is an a.s. event with (A
c × R+) ∩ B1/n = ∅,
n ∈ N. By switching signs we obtain the same result for |oαt −
oατ | > 1/n in B1/n (we do not
rename any sets).
Now, given any ω ∈ Ac for which α is right-continuous at τ , we must have τ1/⌈ε−1⌉(ω) > τ
for any ε > 0, such that |oαt −
oατ | ≤ 1/
⌈
ε−1
⌉
≤ ε on [τ(ω), τ1/⌈ε−1⌉(ω)) 6= ∅.
A.3 Supplementary results
Lemma A.4. Suppose ϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆ
ϑ
2 and 0 = α
ϑ
i (ϑ) < α
ϑ
j (ϑ) < 1. Then
λϑM
λϑ
L,i
=
αϑj (ϑ)
1−αϑj (ϑ)
.
Proof. We introduce the function µF (x, y) := µL(y, x) = 1− µL(x, y)− µM(x, y) and use the
short-hand notation
µ· = lim inf
tցϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µ·(α
ϑ
i (t), α
ϑ
j (t)), µ· = lim sup
tցϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µ·(α
ϑ
i (t), α
ϑ
j (t)),
αi = lim inf
tցϑ
αϑi (t), αi = lim sup
tցϑ
αϑi (t) and αj = α
ϑ
j (ϑ).
32 See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Lemma 1.22. One needs to restrict dx to {τG(x) <∞}, which is redundant
whenever we have [a, b).
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In our current case ϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆ
ϑ
2 and 0 = α
ϑ
i (ϑ) < α
ϑ
j (ϑ) < 1, we now have
λϑL,i = (1− αj)
1
2
(µL + µL),
λϑL,j = αj + (1− αj)
1
2
(µF + µF )
and thus
λϑM = 1− λ
ϑ
L,i − λ
ϑ
L,j
= (1− αj)
1
2
(2− µL − µL − µF − µF ).
Using αj = limtցϑ α
ϑ
j (t) and the continuity and monotonicity of µL and µF we obtain
λϑM
λϑL,i
=
2− µL − µL − µF − µF
µL + µL
=
2− µL(αi, αj)− µL(αi, αj)− µF (αi, αj)− µF (αi, αj)
µL(αi, αj) + µL(αi, αj)
=
µM (αi, αj) + µM (αi, αj)
µL(αi, αj) + µL(αi, αj)
=
αj
1− αj
.
Lemma A.5. Fix σ ∈ T and suppose
(
G1, α1
)
and
(
G2, α2
)
are time-consistent extended
mixed strategies which induce an equilibrium in all subgames Γϑ beginning at some ϑ ∈ T
taking values in (σ,∞] a.s.
If σ = τˆσ1 = τˆ
σ
2 and limtցσ α
σ
1 (t) = limtցσ α
σ
2 (t) = 0, then
L1σ − F
1
σ = L
2
σ − F
2
σ = 0 a.s.
Note that we do not impose right-continuity of any ασi at σ in the lemma.
Proof. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Suppose first Liσ > F
i
σ. By hypothesis there exist arbitrarily
small right (random) neighbourhoods of σ in which ασi is bounded away from 1, in which α
σ
j
takes some strictly positive values, and in which Li > F i (≥M i). In any such neighbourhood
we must have by condition (3.1) that
ασj > 0⇒ α
σ
j ≥
Li − F i
Li −M i
,
implying lim suptցσ
Li−F i
Li−M i
= 0 and therefore Liσ = F
i
σ.
Now suppose Liσ < F
i
σ. Then in any right (random) neighbourhood of σ in which L
i < F i
and ασj is bounded away from 1, α
σ
i can only be strictly positive where α
σ
j = 0, i.e., the
supports of ασi and α
σ
j in these neighbourhoods must be disjoint. Hence, whenever α
σ
i > 0,
player i becomes leader and must prefer so over becoming follower at the next time when
ασj > 0. Now consider neighbourhoods between σ and
σ′ := inf
{
t ≥ σ | Lit − L
i
σ ≥ (F
i
σ − L
i
σ)/3 or F
i
t − F
i
σ ≤ −(F
i
σ − L
i
σ)/3
}
> σ.
At any stopping time ϑ ∈ [σ, σ′], i can only prefer to stop if ασj = 0 on [σ, σ
′], which contradicts
the hypothesis.
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